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Abstract 
 
What explains the intensity and the forms of transatlantic regulatory cooperation in 
banking over the last three decades? This paper defines regulatory cooperation as 
information exchange; mutual recognition; and international regulatory harmonisation. 
It argues that the intensity of transatlantic regulatory cooperation has been subject to 
‘ebb and flow’ and has taken different forms over time. When EU-US preferences are 
broadly aligned, all the main forms of transatlantic regulatory cooperation are intense. 
When preferences are different, especially in the context and aftermath of exogenous 
shocks of financial crises, cooperation is less intense. Moreover, the US and the EU 
privilege different forms of regulatory cooperation, depending on their ability to 
pursue the desired outcomes in different institutional venues. 
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Introduction 
 
The United States (US) and the European Union (EU) have very large banking sectors 
and are the main trading partners in banking services. Thus, transatlantic cooperation 
is crucial if there is to be any form of effective global governance in banking. 
According to Ahearns, 2  transatlantic regulatory cooperation can take three main 
forms: information exchange; mutual recognition,3 which takes place when two or 
more jurisdictions agree to recognize each other’s rules in lieu of domestic rules,4 and 
regulatory harmonisation,5 which refers to the establishment of similar (harmonised) 
rules,6 mainly through international standard setting.7 
 
Has transatlantic regulatory cooperation in banking intensified and/or taken different 
forms over time, especially in the context and aftermath of the recent international 
financial crisis? More generally, what explains the variation of intensity in 
transatlantic regulatory cooperation and the different forms it has taken over the last 
three decades? This paper contends that transatlantic regulatory cooperation in 
banking has been subject to ‘ebb and flow’. Its overall intensity increased in the late 
1990s and early 2000s, only to decline after the international financial crisis. 
Although information exchange has increased, in the aftermath of the crisis there have 
been steps backwards on mutual recognition and the emergence of US-EU regulatory 
disputes. Moreover, US-EU disagreements have become apparent in international 
regulatory fora as well as in the domestic implementation of internationally agreed 
rules. Recently, the EU has attempted to embed discussions on financial regulation in 
transatlantic trade negotiations, a move that was resisted by the US.  
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These trends are explained by the alignment or misalignment of regulatory 
preferences amongst the two jurisdictions and by their attempts to seek forms of 
cooperation that better enable each of them to pursue its regulatory preferences. When 
US and EU preferences are similar, all forms of transatlantic regulatory cooperation 
are intense. In contrast, when preferences are different, especially after the exogenous 
shocks of financial crises, cooperation is more problematic. Moreover, the US and the 
EU privilege different forms of cooperation, depending on their ability to pursue the 
desired outcomes in different institutional venues.  
 
2. State of the art and explanatory framework 
 
This paper sets out to investigate the intensity and the forms of transatlantic 
regulatory cooperation in banking — namely information exchange, mutual 
recognition and international harmonisation — over time. Here the main focus is on 
the latter two, because information exchange is a very ‘light’ form of cooperation and 
to a large extent it is a precondition for the other two. The intensity of cooperation is 
gauged by the extent to which these two jurisdictions agree on the mutual recognition 
of each other’s rules (or, at the very least, they are willing to grant exemptions) and 
prevent (or, at least, quickly resolve) cross-border regulatory disputes; and the extent 
to which they agree (or disagree) in the process of standard-setting in international 
regulatory fora, followed by the implementation of these agreements domestically.8 
 
The international political economy literature has so far paid scant attention to 
transatlantic regulatory cooperation in banking over time. 9  However, there is an 
extensive literature on international standard setting by the Basel Committee on 
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Banking Supervision (BCSB),10 whereby researchers have examined the negotiations 
of the so-called Basel I accord in 1989,11 the Basel II accord in 2005,12 and the Basel 
III accord in 2010.13 A second strand of international political economy literature has 
examined the bilateral regulatory relations in finance between the US and the EU, 
albeit not with specific reference to banking, but rather to accounting and securities 
markets.14  
 
The literature mentioned above postulates that the main rationale for transatlantic 
cooperation is the attempt by US and EU officials to solve the ‘dilemma’15 between 
the need to secure domestic financial stability and protect the competitiveness of their 
national financial sector in globalised markets. In the banking sector, the dilemma 
becomes a ‘trilemma’ because banks provide credit to the real economy. Hence, 
economic growth is the third objective that policy makers seek to secure (or at least 
not to impinge upon) through banking regulation.16 
 
In setting the terms for regulatory cooperation, each jurisdiction favours international 
or bilateral rules that do not pose significant domestic adjustment costs17 — that is, 
that do not place the national financial industry at a competitive disadvantage or 
impose an overhaul of the domestic regulatory framework in place. Hence, the 
configuration of national financial systems18  and domestic regulatory frameworks 
shape the preferences of the various jurisdictions concerning the terms (that is, the 
content and scope) of transatlantic cooperation. 19  We follow this insight in the 
empirical sections of the paper in order to tease out the main regulatory preferences of 
the US, the EU and the main member states therein. Moreover, we expect that 
whenever US and EU preferences are similar or at least not competing, transatlantic 
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regulatory cooperation will be intense. By contrast would expect that whenever US 
and EU regulatory preferences differ significantly, transatlantic regulatory 
cooperation will be more problematic and hence less intense.  
 
What enable jurisdictions to pursue their regulatory preferences internationally? The 
existing literature has mostly focused on ‘institutional complementarities’; 20 
‘regulatory capacity’;21 market size;22 the ‘cohesiveness’ of a jurisdiction;23 and the 
support or opposition from the financial industry.24  
 
With the exception of Drezner25  — who explains why the ‘great powers’ prefer 
different types of international regulatory regimes — less attention has been paid to 
how different forms of cooperation and the institutional venues through which 
transatlantic cooperation takes place can affect the ability of the main jurisdictions to 
pursue their preferences. For example, the US has traditionally had a prominent role 
in international regulatory fora in finance.26 By contrast, the EU is by now considered 
a ‘trade power’,27 even though the inclusion of financial regulation in trade deals is 
subject to the so called ‘carve out’.  
 
We expect that the US and the EU will privilege the forms of cooperation that better 
enable each of them to pursue (though not necessarily achieve) their preferences, 
especially if their preferences are not aligned. By contrast, if transatlantic regulatory 
preferences are aligned, cooperation will be intense in all the main forms. There are 
two main limits to our analysis. First, given its long timeframe and the number of 
policy episodes examined, space constraints prevent us from engaging in an in-depth 
analysis of domestic preference formation in the main jurisdictions. What we present 
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here is a first cut explanation of the ‘revealed’ preferences of policy-makers in the 
main jurisdictions, mainly on the basis of the configuration of national banking 
systems. Second, on several occasions, there was not an EU position as such. Hence, 
our analysis investigates in a concise way the preferences of the main EU member 
states, even though reference to the EU as a whole is often used as shorthand in the 
overall discussion. 
 
3. Limited transatlantic regulatory cooperation in banking in the 1980s and early 
1990s 
 
In the 1980s and 1990s, the intensity of transatlantic regulatory cooperation was 
relatively low because the preferences of the US and the EU (as well as within the 
EU) were not aligned. Internationally, the US, later joined by the UK, instigated the 
Basel I accord, which was initially resisted by other European countries that worried 
about the implications that higher capital requirements would have for the real 
economy. Bilateral cooperation mainly concerned the terms of access of US and EU 
banks to each other’s markets on the basis of the principle of national treatment.  
 
3.1 US-EU (difficult) cooperation on international harmonisation: Basel I 
 
In 1988, the BCBS issued the Basel I accord ‘International convergence of capital 
measurement and capital standards’, which set in place capital rules for internationally 
active banks. In the negotiations on the accord, the US and later the UK were ‘pace-
setters’, whereas continental countries reluctantly followed.28  This ‘divide’ in the 
negotiations suggests that transatlantic regulatory cooperation on the harmonisation of 
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capital rules was limited: different members of the BCBS had different preferences, 
mostly rooted in the configuration of national financial systems and domestic 
regulatory frameworks. 
 
In the 1980s, part of the US banking system was highly internationalised. Several big 
US banks operated abroad, mainly in Europe (especially in London) and had invested 
in South America, where they suffered heavy losses as a result of the debt crisis of the 
1980s.29 Several under-capitalised US banks (see Table 1) were unable to withstand 
these losses and were resolved. Moreover, the US was host to subsidiaries of a 
number of large European and Japanese banks. The increasing market share of the 
(under-capitalised) Japanese banks was of particular concern for US banks and 
policy-makers alike, as was the concern about the (unreliable) measurement of capital 
positions for Japanese banks,30 as suggested by the bloated Japanese figures in Table 
1, which predate the adoption of the Basel 1 definition of captial. In the late 1980s, 
after several bank failures, US policy-makers decided to impose higher risk-based 
capital requirements, which represented a cost for US banks, damaging their 
competitiveness vis-à-vis foreign banks that operated with lower capital.31 Hence, US 
policy-makers called for the introduction of risk-weighted capital standards 
internationally, with a view to creating a level playing field. 
 
Like the US, the UK had been plagued by a series of domestic bank failures, the most 
well-known of which was that of Johnson Matthey Bankers Limited in 1984. 32 
Moreover, the UK hosted the subsidiaries of a large number of foreign banks, many of 
which were under-capitalised. Like their American counterparts, British policy-
makers reacted to domestic bank failures by increasing risk-based capital 
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requirements, which weakened the competitiveness of British banks vis-à-vis foreign 
competitors. Hence, British policy-makers joined US policy-makers in calling for 
international capital requirements.33  
 
By contrast, the main European continental countries had not suffered major bank 
failures in the 1980s. Unlike in the US, banks provided the bulk of the credit to the 
real economy in all the countries of continental Europe (see Table 1). Moreover, the 
regulatory frameworks in place in continental countries had distinctive features 
including the definition of what counted as bank capital, that could not be easily taken 
into account in the formulation of international capital rules. Hence, France and 
Germany were lukewarm towards the proposed international agreement. The EU (at 
that time it was still the European Community) as a whole did not have its own capital 
rules, which varied considerably across the member states.34 There was no EU attempt 
to coordinate the positions of its, then, eight member states sitting in the BCBS.  
 
The US-UK alliance won over Japanese policy-makers. After an agreement was 
reached among the officials of these three countries, the other members of the BCBS 
reluctantly decided to join in and the Basel I accord was signed. The accord was a 
non-legally binding gentlemen’s agreement. Its rules became legally binding only 
when incorporated into the national legislation of the member countries. 35  The 
implementation of the accord was rather straightforward in the US, since most of its 
content had been ‘uploaded’ from the US regulatory framework. In the EU, the accord 
was ‘downloaded’ into legally binding legislation, the Capital Requirements directive 
(CRD) (1993), which applied to all banks and investment firms, regardless of size — 
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given concerns that the directive would create distortions in the European Single 
Market.  
 
3.2. US-EU cooperation in bilateral regulatory relations: challenging the principle 
of national treatment 
 
In the 1980s and 1990s, bilateral regulatory relations in banking were based on the 
principle of national treatment, whereby EU banks that wanted to operate in the US 
(and vice versa) were subject to the same domestic rules applied to US-headquartered 
banks (and vice versa). In the US, investment banking and commercial banking were 
separated. Indeed, the Glass-Steagall Act (1933) limited the range of financial 
services that a (US or foreign) bank could provide in the US, and prohibited 
commercial banks from participating in the investment banking business. Moreover, 
geographical restrictions were imposed on US banks and foreign banks operating in 
the US.36 
 
Unlike in the US, in the EU the ‘universal bank’ model was widespread, at least from 
the late 1980s onwards.37 Universal banks can provide a variety of financial services, 
such as securities trading and underwriting, besides banking activities. Moreover, 
banks in the EU were not subject to geographical restrictions because the First 
Banking directive (1977) removed obstacles to the provision of services and to the 
establishment of branches across the EU according to a set of harmonized rules. For 
this reason, bilateral cooperation based on national treatment was unsatisfactory for 
the main EU member states whose banks operated in the US. They argued that EU 
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banks operating in the US were subject to a host of restrictions, whereas US banks 
operating in Europe were not subject to similar restrictions.  
 
When negotiations began in 1988 on the Second Banking Directive, which was 
designed to promote banking integration in the EU, the large European banks 
operating in the US and their home member states argued that the new passport 
regime would provide considerable benefits to US banks operating in Europe, and 
therefore they expected a more accommodating stance from US policy-makers.38 In 
contrast, US banks argued that European banks operating in the US should be subject 
to the same rules applied to US-headquartered banks, so as to avoid an uneven 
playing field. US policy-makers were also opposed to the introduction of exemptions 
for European banks operating in the US.  
 
In order to exert some influence on US policy-makers, when the European 
Commission put forward the initial draft of the Second Banking Directive in 1988, it 
envisaged that banks from third countries would be allowed to benefit from the single 
passport in the EU, only if EU banks received reciprocal (mirror) treatment in these 
third countries. 39  The European Commission would undertake the reciprocity 
examination for each bank that applied to establish a subsidiary in the EU. For US 
banks, this interpretation posed the direct threat of discrimination, since mirror 
treatment was not given in the US. The US policy-makers threatened retaliation, 
which was particularly worrisome for the UK, given the scale of operations of several 
British banks in the US and several US banks in the City of London. Following 
significant compromise, the Second Banking Directive eventually adopted included 
only a national treatment test, not reciprocity.40  
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4. Intense ‘market-friendly’ transatlantic regulatory cooperation in banking in 
the late 1990s and mid 2000s 
 
From the late 1990s to the outbreak of the international financial crisis, the intensity 
of transatlantic regulatory cooperation was high because the regulatory preferences in 
the US and the EU (and within the EU) were broadly aligned. Internationally, the 
Basel II agreement was negotiated without the deep-seated divisions between the US 
and the EU (or, to be precise, continental European countries) that characterised the 
negotiations on Basel I. Bilaterally, the US and the EU continued to apply to each 
other’s banks the principle of national treatment or non-discrimination. Furthermore, 
the Federal Reserve issued some exemptions for European banks operating in the US 
– it was a tentative step towards mutual recognition.  
 
4.1 US-EU cooperation in international ‘market-friendly’ harmonisation: Basel II 
 
The 1990s and early 2000s were characterised by the absence of major banking crises 
in the US and the EU. Several large banks that had complex risk management models 
in place began to lobby hard to convince policy-makers that this should be taken into 
account in setting (lowering, in their case) capital requirements.41 The US and UK 
that hosted several large cross-border banks were particularly sympathetic to this view 
which, however, was also widely accepted by the other BCBS members. It should 
also be noted that by 2003 US banks had improved their capital positions, as 
compared to European banks, including the UK (see Table 1). 
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The negotiations on Basel II, the successor of Basel I, gained momentum in June 1999, 
and the accord was eventually agreed in 2004. It based capital requirements on three 
pillars. Pillar One was concerned with minimum capital requirements, covering three 
types of risk: ‘credit risk’, ‘market risk’, and, innovatively, ‘operational risk’. Pillar 2 
was based on a supervisory review process, aimed at covering external factors that 
were not fully taken into account when computing the minimum capital requirements. 
Finally, Pillar 3 was to be the discipline imposed by the market, facilitated by 
transparency requirements.  
 
Unlike Basel I, which was largely based on the US regulatory template, Basel II   
contained a new set of rules that was not uploaded by any national jurisdiction. 
Whereas it partly built on Basel I, the new rules were informed by proposals and 
studies from large cross-border banks and banking associations, first and foremost the 
Institute for International Finance.42 The influence of large banks was strengthened by 
the fact that the BCBS had insufficient expertise and had to rely on the banks and 
banking associations to provide technical input into the process.43 As opposed to the 
negotiations on Basel I, on Basel II there was no clear cut division between the US 
and UK on one side and continental European countries on the other.  
 
Overall, the US and the EU had similar (or at least compatible) preferences, with the 
main exception concerning the implications of the new capital rules for the real 
economy and to be precise for bank credit to small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs). In the US and to some extent in the UK, the bank-industry relationship was 
weak in comparison to that found in continental European countries, where banks 
provide the main source of funding to industry (see Table 1), especially to SMEs 
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which produce a comparatively large part of national output in Germany, France and 
Italy.44 The changes that were agreed during the negotiations to the rules regarding the 
risk weight for lending to SMEs can largely be ascribed to the activity of the 
representatives from the main European countries.45  
 
What accounts for the alignment of preferences across the Atlantic unlike during the 
previous period? The explanation is two-fold. First, although the configuration of the 
banking systems in the US and across the EU did not substantially change or converge 
over the 1990s, it was easier for regulators on both sides of the Atlantic to agree on 
making rules more market friendly, than it had been for them to agree on the 
tightening up of rules in Basel I and later on in Basel III. Moreover, the absence of 
major financial upheavals in developed countries in this period facilitated the 
convergence of national regulators towards the US-UK sponsored market-friendly 
approach to financial market regulation.46 
  
The Basel II accord was subsequently downloaded, with some modifications, into EU 
legislation — the so-called CRD III (2006) — which applied to banks and investment 
firms of all sizes.47 By contrast, towards the end of the Basel II negotiations, US 
policy-makers made clear that they intended to apply Basel II rules to only 15 or so 
internationally active banks. 48  Local community banks complained that the 
application of Basel II in the US would reduce capital requirements for big banks, 
giving them a comparative advantage vis-à-vis community banks.49 Some members of 
Congress shared these concerns,50 which substantially delayed the implementation of 
Basel II in the US.51 Hence, even though EU-US cooperation was intense during the 
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Basel II negotiations, it weakened in the context of the domestic implementation 
phase in the US. 
 
4.2 Building US-EU cooperation in bilateral regulatory relations: limited 
exemptions 
 
The bilateral regulatory approach based on national treatment in the US and the EU 
was maintained when Congress passed the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, which 
removed most restrictions on affiliations between commercial banks and other kinds 
of financial firms for both domestic and foreign banks operating in the US.52 The Act 
also permitted a foreign bank to become a financial holding company. These changes 
reduced the divergence between the US and EU regulatory frameworks. Subsequently, 
in 2001, the Federal Reserve issued an exemption whereby a foreign bank holding 
company operating in the US but owned by a well-capitalised and well-managed 
foreign bank was not required to meet the capital requirements normally applicable to 
bank holding companies.53 This exemption was an important step towards mutual 
recognition.  
 
5. The conundrum of post crisis transatlantic cooperation in banking  
The international financial crisis was followed by waves of regulatory reform in the 
US and the EU. The intensity of transatlantic regulatory cooperation decreased in 
comparison to the pre-crisis decade because the preferences of the US and the EU 
were not aligned, and within the EU certain countries, notably the UK and Sweden, 
shared several preferences with the US. International harmonisation was fraught with 
difficulty, and the negotiations on Basel III were characterised by a division between 
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the US and UK on one side, and continental European countries on the other. In 
bilateral relations, the US and the EU backtracked on mutual recognition and some 
regulatory disputes emerged. Finally, transatlantic cooperation in financial (including 
banking) regulation was also discussed in the context of the Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership (TTIP). 
 
5.1 Limited US-EU cooperation in ratcheting–up international harmonisation: 
Basel III 
 
The global financial crisis brought into sharp relief the inadequacy of existing capital 
requirements and therefore the need to revise the content of the Basel II accord. The 
BCBS put forward concrete proposals in December 2009 and the final agreement was 
reached in September 2010. The new rules will be phased in gradually from January 
2013 until 2019. The Basel III accord built on the Basel II Accord rather than 
reinventing it altogether. 
 
In the negotiations on Basel III, the ‘old’ (i.e., Basel I) divide re-emerged between the 
US and the UK on the one side, and continental European countries on the other.54 
The US and the UK wanted a stricter definition of capital, to be limited to ordinary 
shares; higher capital requirements, including capital buffers; a leverage ratio; 
liquidity rules; and a short transition period.55 Continental countries, in particular 
France and Germany, wanted lower capital requirements and a broader definition of 
capital, including hybrids — that is, capital which has some features of both debt and 
equity, including silent participations (long term loans). They opposed the leverage 
ratio, asked for a modification of certain aspects of the liquidity rules, and pushed for 
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a longer transition period.56 The main bone of contention was the effect that the 
tightening up of prudential rules for banks would have on economic growth, 
especially in continental countries where banks provide most of the credit to the real 
economy.  
 
As during the previous periods, the different, and at times incompatible, preferences 
of the US and the UK on one side and continental European countries on the other 
were rooted in the different configuration of their national financial systems and their 
domestic regulatory frameworks. The US and the UK had been badly hit by the 
international financial crisis. Hence policy-makers in these jurisdictions were keen to 
set in place measures that would avoid another crisis. Partly as a result of state capital 
injections (and de facto nationalisation of certain banks in the UK), UK banks and 
especially US banks were well positioned to meet higher capital requirements (see 
Table 1).57 As for the definition of capital, banks in these two countries mostly had 
ordinary shares, which was what US and UK policy-makers advocated for the 
definition of capital in Basel III. There was far less bank reliance on hybrids. The 
leverage ratio was already used in the US, and so were liquidity rules that the UK had 
unilaterally introduced in the midst of the crisis.58  
 
In comparison to their US and UK counterparts, most continental European banks 
were less well capitalised (see Table 1). Hence they would have faced serious 
difficulties in meeting higher capital requirements. Many continental banks had 
distinctive sources of funding and did not issue equity; thus continental policy-makers 
called for a ‘broad’ definition of what would count as Core Tier 1 and Tier 1 capital. 
Indeed, hybrids, and specifically silent participations, were included in the definition 
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of Core Tier 1 capital according to the domestic regulatory framework in several 
continental countries, even though they lacked the loss absorbing character of 
equity.59 Policy-makers in these countries resisted a leverage ratio, arguing that the 
riskiness of the activities of their traditional universal banks was lower than that of 
(largely Anglo-Saxon) investment banks60 and that this feature would not be captured 
by a crude leverage ratio. Continental policy-makers opposed strict liquidity rules, 
which was the weak spot especially of French banks which relied more heavily than 
most of their European competitors on short-term funding on wholesale markets.61 
Finally, continent policy-makers called for a prolonged phase-in period, given their 
concerns about the potential impact of these measures on lending on the bank-based 
continental financial systems (see Table 1), where banks were the main source of 
finance for firms, especially for SMEs.62  
 
Despite attempts by the European Commission to forge a common position, the EU 
presented a disjointed stance during the Basel III negotiations. As in Basel I and II, 
the EU was unable to project a common set of preferences on Basel III. Unlike Basel I, 
in which the influence of the US and the UK was predominant, Basel III was a 
compromise between the positions of the two coalitions at play. In particular, 
continental Europeans were able to secure longer transition periods and lower capital 
requirements, as evidenced by the comparison of the initial document issued by the 
BCBS in December 2009 and the (less ambitious) document eventually agreed in 
December 2010. 63  In the domestic implementation of the accord, the EU was 
criticised for not implementing Basel III properly because the CRD IV differed in 
several important respects from the internationally agreed standards.64 In the US, the 
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Basel III rules were considered as a floor, not a maximum, as explained in the 
following section.  
  
5.2 Going its own way: US rules on foreign-owned banks  
 
The Dodd-Frank Act, which was the main regulatory response in the US to the global 
financial crisis,65 instructed the Federal Reserve to implement enhanced prudential 
standards for large foreign banks as well as for large domestic bank holding 
companies and nonbank systemically important financial institutions. The Act also 
extended the well-capitalized and well-managed requirements beyond US bank 
subsidiaries to the top-tier US and foreign holding companies.66 The so-called Collins 
Amendment, named after the Congressman who championed it, removed the 
exemption from the bank holding companies’ capital requirements granted by the 
Federal Reserve to foreign banks in 2001.67 Certain foreign banks, such as Barclays 
and Deutsche Bank, circumvented this provision by dropping the bank holding 
company status.68  
 
The Fed responded by putting forward a proposal in December 2012 whereby foreign 
banks that had more than $50 billion in US assets and also exceeded that level via 
their non-US operations would have to place all their US subsidiaries into an 
intermediate holding company, a provision that challenged the established principle of 
national treatment. These intermediate holding companies would be expected to 
comply with Basel III’s capital and liquidity standards on their own terms, and would 
be subject to the Fed’s stress-testing regime.69 Foreign-owned banks with less than 
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$50 billion in US assets would be required to set up intermediate holding companies, 
but would face less onerous regulations.  
 
 Deutsche Bank, which was reported to need to inject $20bn into Taunus to meet these 
requirements, complained to US policy-makers, arguing it was put at a competitive 
disadvantage compared to American banks that operated overseas.70 The European 
Commission and some European policy-makers also complained to US policy-makers, 
arguing that the proposed rules ran counter to the principle of consolidated 
supervision by the home authorities, and imposed additional costs for EU banks 
operating in the US. Michel Barnier, the European Commissioner for the Internal 
Market, wrote to Chairman of the Federal Reserve, Ben Bernanke and warned that: 
  
certain elements of the ‘Foreign Banking Organizations’ Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking’ … could spark a protectionist reaction from 
other jurisdictions.71 
 
Despite the EU’s call for exemptions based on the principle of equivalence, in July 
2013, the Federal Reserve approved a final rule on the banks’ capital framework, as 
part of the domestic implementation of the Basel III rules. The legislation asserted 
that US subsidiaries of foreign-owned banks had to comply with the US 
implementation of the Basel rules, whereby the US policy-makers wanted to make 
sure that enough capital was available in the US to deal with foreign-owned banks 
experiencing financial difficulties.  
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5.3 Seeking new forms of transatlantic cooperation: the Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership (TTIP) (2013-15) 
 
In early 2013, the European Commission and US Government agreed to launch 
negotiations on a free trade agreement called the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP).72 The main aims of the partnership were to increase trade and 
investment between the US and EU by reducing tariffs (particularly on agricultural 
products), aligning regulations and standards, improving protection for overseas 
investors, and increasing access to services and government procurement markets by 
foreign providers.  
 
Since both the US and the EU included financial services in prior free trade 
agreements, they implicitly recognized that the TTIP accord would also cover this 
sector, but they disagreed about what to include in the financial services chapter. The 
US preferred to handle financial services as in prior trade negotiations by including 
market access issues in the TTIP. But US Trade Representative Michael Froman 
argued that ‘that nothing we do in a trade agreement should undermine the ability of 
regulators on both sides to regulate in the public interest’ and that regulatory 
cooperation should be negotiated within ‘existing and appropriate global forums, such 
as the G-20 and international standard setting bodies, in parallel alongside the TTIP 
negotiations’.73 US policy-makers argued that financial regulation was not a trade 
issue and were concerned that the financial industry in the US would seek to use 
regulatory convergence with the EU in order to dilute the financial regulation adopted 
in the US after the global financial crisis.74 
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In contrast, the EU wanted to move beyond what had been included in previous trade 
agreements. In June 2013, the Council of Ministers’ directives for the negotiations on 
TTIP stated the aims of ‘regulatory harmonisation, equivalence, or mutual recognition, 
where appropriate’. 75  With reference to ‘sectors of significant importance to the 
transatlantic economy, including, financial services’ the objectives were ‘ensuring the 
removal of existing NTBs, preventing the adoption of new NTBs and allowing market 
access’ as well as ‘common frameworks for prudential cooperation’. 76  With the 
energetic support of the European Banking Federation, EU officials argued that 
leaving out any discussion of regulation of the financial services industry in the 
proposed TTIP would be an omission.77  
 
In January 2014, the European Commission produced a position paper proposing that 
regulatory cooperation between the EU and the US should be based on a number of 
principles. The most important and unprecedented was the proposal for ‘mutual 
consultations in advance of any new financial measures that may significantly affect 
the provision of financial services between the EU and the US and to avoid 
introducing rules unduly affecting the jurisdiction of the other party’.78 The financial 
industry on both sides of the Atlantic was keen to have financial services regulation 
included in TTIP.79  
 
In May 2014, a (leaked) document produced by the European Commission for the EU 
Trade Policy Committee, revealed that the EU offer did not contain any commitment 
on financial services reflecting the view that ‘there should be close parallelism in the 
negotiations on market access and regulatory aspects of financial services. Given the 
firm US opposition to include financial services regulatory cooperation in TTIP, it is 
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considered appropriate not to include any commitment concerning financial services 
to the general EU’s market access offer at this stage. The situation may change in the 
future if the US shows willingness to engage solidly on regulatory cooperation’.80 
This was clearly an attempt by the EU to put pressure on the US to revise their 
negotiation position on financial regulatory cooperation in TTIP.81  However, this 
attempt to put pressure on the US was not very successful because US financial firms 
and products already had very good access to the EU market under international 
agreements dating back 20 years. The EU had also made a services offer in a separate 
multilateral services trade deal, to which the United States was a party, which did 
include financial services.82 
 
The EU was keen to include financial regulation in TTIP for three main reasons. First, 
the EU wanted to limit the extra territorial reach of some US rules, for example in 
banking or OTC derivatives. Barnier explicitly argued in this context that  
 
…US rules on Foreign Banking Organizations should be revised. They do 
not recognize non-US prudential rules. And they discriminate against non-
US banks. And we need to prove that we trust each other by ensuring 
equivalence or ‘substituted compliance’.83  
 
Second, EU policy-makers preferred to negotiate with one set of US policy-makers 
(namely, trade officials) in the context of the TTIP, rather than negotiating 
transatlantic financial regulatory issues with a multitude of US financial regulators. 
Third, EU policy-makers hoped that US negotiators in TTIP would be more amenable 
to compromise than US financial regulators, whose primary mission was securing 
 23 
financial stability and consumer protection in the US. By contrast, the US authorities 
ruled out the inclusion of financial services in TTIP. The main opposition came from 
US financial regulators, who opposed the discussion of regulatory matters that were 
their responsibility in the context of trade negotiations and argued that financial 
regulatory cooperation should continue separately in existing global fora.84 
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper contributes to and develops further one of the main themes of the special 
issue85 — namely the conundrum concerning post crisis international and transatlantic 
regulatory cooperation in banking — by considering this cooperation from a broader 
long term perspective and pointing to its ebb and flow over time. Three broad 
conclusions can be drawn as to the development of cooperation over the past twenty-
five years.  
 
First, transatlantic regulatory cooperation was more intense in the 1990s and mid 
2000s when — in the absence of major financial crises in the western world — US 
and EU preferences converged towards a ‘market-friendly’ approach, which was 
based on reducing regulatory constraints. Transatlantic regulatory cooperation was 
more problematic in the aftermath of the international financial crisis, when 
international banking guidelines (Basel III) and domestic banking regulation were 
tightened up — the latter albeit in different ways. Hence, financial crises do not 
necessarily facilitate regulatory cooperation because even if national regulators might 
have the same objective, that is to restore financial stability, the configuration of 
national financial systems and their links to the real economy are different. National 
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regulators have different preferences on the content of re-regulation after crises. The 
EU was internally divided on this issue. 
 
Second, the US and the EU privileged different forms of and venues for transatlantic 
regulatory cooperation. Moreover, the EU was internally divided on this issue. The 
US and the UK sought international regulatory harmonisation in international 
financial fora — to be precise the BCBS — for three main reasons. First, the US and 
especially the UK had many foreign banks operating on their territory. Hence they 
were particularly sensitive to the need to avoid competitive distortions internationally, 
and this could be achieved only through international standards.86 Second, the US and 
(less) the UK have traditionally been very influential in the BCBS, as well as in other 
international regulatory fora in finance.87 Third, since the Basel accords were not 
legally binding, they did not tie the hands of US regulators that enjoyed extensive 
regulatory powers domestically. In addition to international regulatory harmonisation, 
the US pursued a unilateralist approach in banking regulation post crisis because this 
approach had been used in the past, especially in securities markets. 
 
Third, the EU preferred mutual recognition — particularly with the reinforcement of 
EU regulatory capacity over time — as the main form of transatlantic regulatory 
cooperation. Mutual recognition allowed the EU to present a cohesive position based 
on EU legislation, which, in turn, was often the result of the reconciliation of the 
different member state preferences. In international fora, the EU was often unable to 
present a cohesive position because of the different preferences of the member states 
and the lack of unified representation. By contrast, the European Commission was in 
the driving seat in negotiating mutual recognition agreements on behalf of the EU as 
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well as in the TTIP negotiations. The EU was a pace-setter in mutual recognition, 
which was a core principle of the single European financial market.  
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